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There are same criticisms of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of
painting that make sense and some that da not. In this paper, I
would like to consider same criticisms that have gained fairly
widespread currency, largely through the counter-thought of Jean-
Francois Lyotard but also Michel Foucault and Foucault's Belgian
surrealist correspondent, Rene Magritte, featurad in This is not B
pipe. The points at issue have to do with the Questions of whether
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of pain~ing falsely valorizes
representational or figurative painting over non-representational
abstract art, and the related question of whether Merleau-Ponty's
philosophy of painting is tl1erefore the expression of the illusions of
nostalgia for a kind of expressionism in art and philosophy of art
that belongs to a past age. Along with the nostalgia for an
exemplary past age of painting and philosophy goes also a
complaint regarding Merleau-Ponty's views apparently devaluing
photography in the economy of images representing visual truth.
The key text with which we will be dealing is Merleau-
Ponty's Eye Bnd Mind, a remarkable work of 93 pages that the
philosopher published in 1961 as his third and climactic study of
modern painting. To summarize it in any detail would dalay us from
considering the critiQue, so it will be necessary to assume some
points of familiarity with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. However, we
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will make Merleau-Ponty's positions as clear as possible as we
consider the criticisms.
It is worth pausing for a moment over the meaning of
nostalgia itself. Nostalgia is a human feeling of a kind of vast
melancholy in the face of loss or dispossession, the heart's affliction
that Pascal captured when he described humanity as a
"dispossessed monarch" in the Pensees, 'that Camus captured a.s
the atmosphere of EXIle Bnd the Kingdom. We could hardly agree
with a notion that condemns the feeling of nostalgia itself as in
some sense "bad,· for it is part of the complexity of human
emotion. Yet we know that feelings are intimately involved with
cognitive judgments about the value of the objects toward which
they are directed. To the extent, then, that nostalgia is a thought
that values the past that is lost in a way that casts a shadow over
present and future, we can at least entertain the notion that there
is a kind of "bad" nostalgia that damages present life. This bad
nostalgia is connected with a false romanticism for the past and a
Iyricism in expressing adoration for it. Since the criticism based on
bad nostalgia is also now made of Heidegger's philosophies of art
and X technology, the criticism includes a political edge that
involves an accusation of political innocence. It is this political
innocence that Milan Kundera has satirized in establishing the
conjunction among youth, romanticism and Iyric poetry in a novel
like Life is Elsewhere. This title, taken from the last line of Andre
Breton's surrealist manifesto and painted by students on the walls
of the Sorbonne during the 1968 student demonstrations, perfectly
expresses the nostalgie longing: real life is elsewhere.
There seem to me to be several strands to what critics of
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of painting have in mind when they
accuse Eye and Mind of a bad nostalgia. A first strand is expressed
in Lyotard's sarcastic remark that Merleau-Ponty cannot valorize
"Cezanne or Giacometti, without immediately devalorizing other
experimentations, such as Marey's, the cubists,' or Duchamp's....
But Being didn't choose Cezanne to express itself, now did it1 Nor
Merleau-Ponty, nor anyone. Don't try to re-establish these
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ponderous eleetions, poetie institution, Heideggerian preaehing. ",
Rene Magritte seeonds the opinion: "The only kind of painting
Merleau-Ponty deals with is a variety of serious but futile divertisse-
ment, of value only to well-intentioned humbugs."2 Oh weil,
Magritte was Belgian. Nevertheless, it is evident that in Eye IJnd
Mind Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of painting remains eommitted to
the view that painting is the expression of the world. This is far
from an imitation or copy theory of art, but is also far from an
aesthetic oriented toward the picture surface as a play of internal
differences independent of worldly reference.
I think that it is relatively easy to show that the claim that
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of painting is seleetively skewed toward
the expressionism of Cezanne and a few other paradigmatic artists
is wrong. The easiest eviden'ce to marshall derives from a elose
study of the photographic reproductions of art works that Merleau-
Ponty selected for inclusion with the written text. These inelude oil
paintings by Paul Klee and Nicholas de Stael, a watercolor by
Cezanne, drawings by Giacometti and Matisse, and sculptures by
Rodin and Germaine Richier. Of the three paintings that were
chosen, the Klee work from 1938 entitled "Park near Lucerne" and
the painting by Stael entitled "Corner of a Studio" or "Green Studio"
from 1954 are both quite abstract. Stael (1914-1955) was a
Russian~born painter, who was a friend of Georges Braque in Paris
and whose life and painting had evident affinities with Van Gogh.3
Stael's abstract compositions were built up from large planes and
free architecture, which toward the last three years of his career
edged back toward representation such as we find in the 1954
1 Jean-Fnncoi. Lyotard, "Philoaopby and Paintina in the A,e of Their Experimentation:
Contribution to an Idea of Poltmodernity," traDI. M. Brewer and D. Brewer, in 7Jae Lyotard
RetJder, cd. Andrew Benjamin (Oxford: Ba.iI Blackwell~ 1984), p. 189. Ori.inally publilhed
in Ctunera Obscurtl~ 110. 12 (1984): 110-125.
2 Rene Magritte, "Leuer to Alphoftle de Waelhena (April 28, 1962)," in Harry Torczyner,
ed., Magrlue: sipsand 1mo,es, tralll. by Riebant Miller (New York: Harry N. Abnma, Inc.,
1977), p. 55.
3 One of Nicbola. de Stael'.laat wom. entitled "Le. Mouette." (1955) teeall. Van Oogh'.
"Pay...e aux Corbeaux," and Stael'.life ended in a tralie IlJicide a. mylteriou. a. that ofVan
Gogb. Cf. Michael Seuphor, Dlcdonary 0/ AbltrtJcl Palnllng, tnna. Lionel Izod, Jobn
Montague aOO Fnnci. Scarfe (New York: Pari. Boot Center, 1958), p. 267.
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composition selected by Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's painting
selections indicate the progress of his interest in painting toward
more abstract forms of expression in which the integrity of the
canvas as a two-dimensional surface is more prominent. This is a
Quite different seleetion of illustrations than the list of paintings to
which Merleau-Ponty referred in "Cezanne's Doubt," for example.
The direetion of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of painting is
also indieated in the ehoiee of a late watereolor to represent the
presence of Cezanne, a watercolor of Mt. Sainte-Vietoire from
1900. In Cezanne's watereolors the many shifting planes
superimposed on top of eaeh other or blended into one another
together with their different levels of depth are more prominently
visible than in Cezanne's oils. Moreover, the blank spaees of white
paper are not filled in, but are surrounded by eolors and thus
incorporated into the scene as more and less brilliant highlights,
unifying visible with invisible. In the watereolors of Cezanne's last
years, Merleau-Ponty eomments, spaee "radiates around planes that
eannot be assigned sny plaee at all" (PriP, 181; OE, 68).4 Without
4 Merleau-Ponty'l writinaa will- be cited witbin tbe body of Ihe text according to the
following abbreviatioDi (tbe En,lilb tranalation fint followed by the French):
English:
PrP 1Jae Primacy 0/ PerceptJon and OIher Essays, ed. lamel Edie (Evanaton:
Northweatem Univeraity Prell, 1964.
1fT Humanism and Terror, trIOI. lohn O'Neill (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
S Signs, trana. Richard C. McCleary (Evanaton: Northweatem Univenity Pre",
1964).
VI 1Jae Visible anti Ihe Invisible, traDI. AlphoDlO Unail (Evanaton: Northwestem
Univeraity Pre.., 1968).
Freneh:
OE L'Oeil ell'espril (paril: Gallimard, 1964).
HT Humanisme ellerreu, (Paril: GaUimard, 1947).
S Signes (Paril: Gallimard, 1960).
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losing the objectivity of his oil paintings, both these features of
Cezanne's watercolors draw our attention to the surface
composition of the painter's late work and its sublimity and
spirituality rather than the features of mass, monumentality and
solidity Merleau-Ponty had ~tressed in RCezanne's Doubt.R5
In addition to the oils by Klee and Stael and the watercolor
by Cezanne, the photograph of an additional fourth painting was
included in the first Art de France publication of Merleau-Ponty's
essay that did not make its way into the Gallimard edition of the
book. When I discovered this, for me it finally put the lie to the
notion that Merleau-Ponty falsely valorized the representational. It
is a painting. by Alain de la Bourdonnaye entitled RCompositionR
(1 960). It consists simply of the juxtaposition of several angular
planes, and unlike the Klee and Stael paintings, bears no representa-
tional title whatsoever: -Composition. - The difference between
figurative and nonfigurative art, Merleau-Ponty says in Eye snd
Mind, Ris badly posed; no grape was ever what it is in the most
figurative painting and no painting, no matter how abstract, can get
away from Being- (PriP, 188; OE, 87).
There are other points we could make about the progress ~f
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of painting toward an outlook inclusive
of abstract experimentation, especially related to his discovery of
the Rflexuous line- as a distinct element of composition, whereas
earlier he had only criticized the prosaic mechanical Une of
Renaissance perspective drawing.8 Nevertheless, it is the ideas in
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of painting in addition to the illustrations
VI Le VISible el I 'invisible (Paris: OaUimard. 1964).
5 Cf. Gotz Adriani, Cezanne Watercolors. traM. Ruuell M. Stockman (New Vork: Harry
N. Abrams, Inc., 1983), pp. 81-94. To my knowled,e, the only commentator who has
discuslCd Merleau-Ponty'. choice of a Cezanne watercolor ra1her than an oil paintina is lohn
M. Carvalho in his e_y entitled "11le Visible aOO the Invisible in Merleau-Pomy aOO
Foucault, " forthcomina in llllemtJllonal Studles In Philosophy. I am ,...teful to Prof. Carvalho
for sending me an advance copy of this e_y.
6 For his new inai.hta re,ardinaline, Merleau-Ponty simply IiD the au1hor aOO title, Henri
Michaux, "Aventures de liane.," without further citation. The work wal publiahed a. the
preface to the French lnulation of Will Grobmann. Paul Klee, lnna. lean DeacouUayes aOO
lean Philippon (paris: Librairie Flinker, 1954), pp. 5-8.
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that must finally decide the issue, so let us turn to these and a
second strand often implied in the critics' accusation of bad
nostalgia. .
The essay's task is to "interrogate painting itself" regarding
the nature of what exists, in order to return "to the 'there is,' to the
site, the soil of the sensible and opened world such as it is in our
life and for our body" (PriP, 160; OE, 12). Merleau-Ponty is explicit
about granting painting and the plastic arts such as sculpture an
ontological privilege over other arts such as music, over science,
and over philosophy. Painting is closer to the palpable life of things
than these, Merleau-Ponty says, joining a line of philosophers
originating in Sch~lIing and coming forward through Nietzsehe to
Heidegger who accord special prominence to artistic work in tracing
the ribs and joints of Being. The quotation from Cezanne's
conversations with Gasquet that prefaces Eye snd Mind expresses
equally the goal of the painter and the philosopher: "What I am
trying to translate to you is more mysterious; it is entwined in the
very roots of being, in the impalpable source of sensations" (PriP,
159; OE, ix).
Against this task, Lyotard wrote in 1984: "The arrogance
of philosophers is metaphysics. Merleau-Ponty, one of the least
arrogant of philosophers, still [says] that the eye's relation to the
visible is the relation of Being to itself in its primordial
'enfolding.,,,7 Rene Magritte wrote that: "Merleau-Ponty's very
brilliant thesis is very pleasant ~o read, but it hardly makes one think
of painting--which he nevertheless appears to be dealing with." 8
Earlier in his doctoral thesis published as Discours, Figure, Lyotard
had written:
Phenomenology cannot reech the donation Ithe pre-reflective
event) because faithful to the philosophical tradition of the West
it remain8 a reflection on knowledge, and the function of such a
reflection is to re-absorb the event, to retrieve the Other in the
Same. ••• On the ba8is of a euphoria Merleau-Ponty ha8
attempted to build a pagen phil080phy. But his paganism remains
7 Lyotard, "Pbiloaophyand Painting in the A,e of1beir Experimentation: Contribution to
an Idea of Poltmodemity," p. 189.
I Mairitte, "Letter 10 Alphonae de WaelheDi (April 28, 1962)," p. SS.
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caught up in 8 problemetic of knowledge; this produces e
phil080phy of intelligent tleeh, which ie a happy philosophy, but
which mis.es the significance of dispossession.9
Later in Discours, FiglJre, lyotard connects Merleau-Ponty's
nostalgia for the lost origin of Western metaphysics with what he
takes to be a related psychological nostalgia for the origin of the
Self in the search for the Mother: wThere is no Father in Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy, or else there is too much: in short, this throws
his discourse into an insatiable demand for the Mother. w1 0
We have now reached a second layer in the accusation of
bad nostalgia, namely that Eye snd Mind expresses the search for
a oneness or principle of envelopment that satisfies the desire for
cognitive, theoretical unity and psychological healing of the wound
between subject and object. We cannot comment fully here in
evaluating this accusation, but must restrict ourselves to a few
remarks. On the one hand, I think that lyotard's reading of
Merleau-Ponty's metaphysics of painting as a pagan philosophy is
a rich and profound one, for I too believe that its basic terms are
informed by Greek pre-Socratic philosophy. On theother hand, I
want briefly. to demonstrate that these very pre-Socratic themes
lead Merleau-Ponty away from a philosophy and psychology of unity
and toward a philosophy of difference and desire, very much like
Lyotard's own outlook.
By the time of Eye snd Mind, Merleau-Ponty recognized that
his earlier phenomenology and thesis of the primacy of perception
and lived-body had remained too closely tied to the unity of the
subject as transcendental ground of the unity of the world. 11 Eye
9 Jean-Francoil Lyotard, Dlscours, Figure, 4th edition (Paril: Editioßl K1incbieck, 1985),
p. 21-22. Translation by Michael B. Smith for Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy 0/ PaJnIlng: A
ReDtkr with Crlticlsm, edited by aalen A. JohDlOO (NortbweItem Univenity Preu,
fortbcomilll' 1993).
10 Ibid., p. 59.
11 In I Womns Note from 77te Visible and the Invisible dated July, 1959 and entitled
"Dualilm-PhilolOphy," Merleau-Ponty wrote: "Tbe probleOll posed in Phmommology 0/
Perceplion are il1lOluble becaule I start there from the 'colllCioulneu'-'object'diltinctioo" (VI,
200; VI, 253).
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and Mind sought to' explore and artieulate a depth or laterality of the
self that is at a distanee from itself, from things and the world, and
from the signifieanees given things in language. Merleau-Ponty
eonveyed these distances, gaps, or spreads in the word eeart. It is
as if Merleau-Ponty had deeided his earlier work had enuneiated
themes on the surfaee of painting and expression, and now he
wanted to get to the heart of the matter. Earlier themes--such as
the lived perspective, gesture and expression, the primaey of the
seeondary quality of color, and the institution and overdetermination
of meaning in the art work--are now set in motion around the
central question of depth, depth in painting, depth in spaee, depth
in self and in Being.
Why is it that painters have so often. said, in the manner of
Klee, that the forest was speaking in them, or the trees were
looking at them, or why did Cezanne say that "nature is on the
inside7" It must be that there is a system of exchanges between
body and world such that eye and hand become the obverse side of
things, the inside of an outside in which are both enveloped. This
extraordinary overlapping or envelopment is one in which seer and
seen are capable of reversing their roles as subject and object, and
the maturation of vision in the life of a painter' is this opening up of
self to the world as "the other side" of its power of looking. The
body seeing beeomes the body looked at; the body touehing
becomes the body touched. Things, for the painter, become an
annex or prolongation of self, encrusted in its flesh, necessarily
"made of the same stuft as the body" (PriP, 163; OE, 19). Merleau-
Ponty refers to this as a good or profound "nareissism" in whieh the
seer is eaught up in the seen, not to see in the outside the eontour
of one's own body, but to emigrate into the world, to be seduced
and captivated by it, "so that the seer and the visible reciproeate
one another and we no langer know which sees and which is seen"
(VI, 139; VI, 183). It is this generality, this anonymity that is called
Flesh. Painting expresses nothing otherthan these "inversions" (ees
renversements) between vision and the visible. It is "the genesis,
the metamorphosis of Being in vision" (PriP, 166; OE, 28).
Merleau-Ponty's notion of the reversibility of Flesh does not
mean the absurdity that the trees and things we see also see us in
return, thus imputing conseiousness and vision to inanimate things
as a heightened and exaggerated Leibnizian panpsyehism. Rather
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it means that the ·seer is eaught up in the midst of the visible, that
in order to see, the seer must in turn be eapable of being seen.
Merleau-Ponty's thought is here driving toward the fact that our
body announees a kind of Rnatural reflection. R12 Thus,
reversibility is an aestheti~ rather than a logieal phenomenon and
does not imply the symmetry of subject and objeet, their
substitutability in meaning, as would be implied by the logical
biconditional. In 'the mirror, the reflection of the right hand is
transposed as the left hand. There is asymmetrieal reversibility,
reflexivity with difference. The world is essentially a genesis in the
erossing over between subjeet and object. The artist bears bodily
witness to this genesis in the metamorphosis of world into art work,
thus eonferring memory and duration upon genesis. 13
We ean now see that the ontology Merleau-Ponty finds
implicit in the work of painting is very far removed from a
metaphysics of substanee and sameness, a monism of the One. In
The Visible snd the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty wrote that Flesh Ris not
matter, is not mind, is not substanee. To designate it, we should
need the old term 'element,' in the sense it was used to speak of
water, air, earth, and fire ... a sort of incarnate principle that
brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of beingR(VI,
139; OE, 184). Merleau-Ponty's aeeount of Flesh in terms of strife
as a unity of opposites should have already signalled the influenee,
not only of Heidegger's essay on RThe Origin of the Work of Art,R
but of Heraelitus. This important direet reference to the Greek
PreSocratic philosophers alerts us to figures like water, air and fire
that occur throughout Eye snd Mind, and point us on from depth to
desire as an ontologicsl, not merely psychologieal, feature of the
world. Being itself, for Merleau-Ponty, as the incarnate principle of
Flesh, is imbued with a kind of energy, longing, desire or constus.
In speaking of Flesh, Merleau-Ponty remembers the element
of air in Eye snd Mind. RWe speak of inspiration and expiration of
Being, action and passion so slightly discernible that it becomes
12 Cf. Gary MadilOß, 1M Phmomenology oJ Merkau-Pomy: 14 Searclt JOT the Umlts oJ
ConsciOUSMSS (Atheßl, Obio: Ohio Univenity Prell. 1981), pp. 98-99.
13 Cf. Paul Klee, 19241ecture at Jena, in Paul Klee: His Ufe and Work in DOCumenlS, ed.
Felix Klee (New Yort: OcolJe Braziller. 1962). pp. 176-177.
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impossible to distinguish between what sees and what is seen,
what paints and what is painted" (Prip, 167; OE, 31-32). Merleau-
Ponty also eonveys the binding synergy in the heart of Being with
images of water. He speaks of the froth and erest of waves, the
water's thiekness as it bends the tiling at the bottom of a pool, and
the longing for "that plaee where there persists, .like the mother
water in erystal, the undividedness of the sensing and the sensed"
(PriP, 179, 182, 163; OE, 62, 70, 20). Nevertheless, through
repetition of terms like spark, fission, explosion, and dehiseenee, it
is the figure of Fire that dominates Eye and Mine/'s aeeount of the
element ealled Flesh, and fire speaks to us of desire. "There is a
human body when, between the seeing and the seen, between
touehing and the touehed, between one eye and the other, between
hand and hand, a blending of some sort takes plaee--when the spark
is lit between sensing and sensible, lighting the fire that will not
stop burning" (PriP, 163, OE, 21). Flesh is an "inearnate prineiple"
of doubling, differenee and desire eroeheted into all that is there.
Jean-Franeois Lyotard, whose Discours, Fi(Jure is helpful about so
mueh in Eye and Mind, eompletely missed both the differenee and
the desire in Merleau-Ponty's treatment of depth in Eye and Mind.
Merleau-Ponty's aceount does not overlook the gaps, splits and
disunities within world and self, eliminating what is strange, foreign
and Other in favor of eonceptual sameness, and Merleau-Ponty's
aeeount has mueh to do with desire, dreams and Eros. It was
Merleau-Ponty who said that painting mixes up the imaginary and
the real "in laying out its oneirie universe of earnal essenees" (PriP,
169; OE, 35).
The figure of fire and the notion of desire it indexes refers
us to genesis and growth, the possibility for new and renewed
expression of the visible simpliciter. The longing within the Flesh is
the longing for vision, new and renewed eomprehension and self-
eomprehension. This is not some new "end" or "teleology of
history," nor is it a nostalgie quest to return us to a lost origin, as
Merleau-Ponty makes elear in the last seetion of Eye Bnd Mind. The
idea of a universal painting and history of painting, of "a totalization
of painting, ,,4 and the idea of a perfect painting found either at a
"beginning" of history in a pagan or primitive origin like the eaves
at Laseaux or at an "end" of history in some misty future, are ideas
that make no sense. In terms of the ontology of painting and the
expression of what exists, the very first painting "went to the
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farthest reach of the future- (Prip, 190; OE, 92) and every painting
stands on its own as an expression, exaltation and re-creation of the
visible world. The desire or conlltus of the Flesh is the demand for
expression, the demand that the world be brought forth over and
over again into visibility. The history of Being is the generous
explosion of the world into ever new and renewed forms. The
history of cultural expression is intensifying, deepening
astonishment in the face of this -there is. - This is the desirs within
the difference whieh is Flesh.
Having no.w been able, we believe, to exonerate Merleau-
Ponty against the accusation of nostalgia on these first two levels,
we now approach a line of Questioning that leaves us with a sense
of ambiguity. Merleau-Ponty built up this remarkable metaphysics
through a study of modern painting and related plastic arts such as
sculpture, to the specific exclusion of other art forms. It is
eustomary to take note of his rather odd reasons for excluding
music, but a different exclusion leads us to a third and final strand
in the nostalgia problematic, namely photography, the problem of
visual truth and Merleau-Ponty's apparent nostalgia for non-
technologieal art forms~ To cite Lyotard's pungent sarcasm one last
time, he refers in 1984 to -the banalities the philosophers of the
decline of the SUfS or of the institution of Being have managed to
peddle concerning photographic arte -14 Fundament~lIy, what I
want to know is whether Merleau-Ponty would be philosophically
eomfortable at EuroDisney strolling through Tomorrowland.
The particularly troubling section of Eye lind Mind that pits
painting against photography occurs in a discussion of the painter
and sculptor's ability to portray motion. Reader's of
Phenomenology of Perception will recognize how important this
passage is, since movement is the key element in Merleau-Ponty's
development of the coneept of the intentional are of the lived-body.
For bodily spatiality, movement is even more fundamental than
touch, which is shown to depend upon it. The stationary, unmoving
bodily eontact with another body loses its sense of touch, and the
intentional are goes limp. In Eye snd Mind, Merleau-Ponty praises
14 Lyoaard, "PhiloaophyaOO Painting in the A,e ofTheir Experimentation: Contribution
to an Idea of Poltmodemity," p. 535.
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the paintings of Gericault for capturing the movement of horses
running at full gallop and criticizes the camera's eye for freezing
movement, making a leaping horse look as if it is leaping in place in
a Zenonian reverie. Following Rodin, Merleau-Ponty writes that Wit
is the artist who is truthful, while the photograph is mendaciousw
(PriP, 185; OE, 80). Merleau-Ponty's criticism of photography as
incapable of capturing the visual truth of movement is consistent
with his similar devaluation of the film camera that displayed in slow
motion Matisse painting, making it appear as if his hand made ten
or so hesitant movements before lighting on the canvas. wThere is
something artificialw in the slow motion camera's eye, Merleau-
Ponty wrote, and WMatisse would be wrong to put his faithWin the
film (5, 45; S 57). .
T0 understand Merleau-Ponty's criticism of photography, we
must first remember that it is his view that visual truth in painting
requires that the painter lie. Citing Sartre, Merleau-Ponty wrote:
WAs always in art, one must lie to tell the truthW(5, 57; S, 71). This
is what the painter of movement can do that the camera cannot.
The painter is able to express movement by portraying trunk, head
and limbs at different instants of time, and through this imaginary
linkage of incompossibles make transition arise on the canvas or in
bronze. The critique of the camera is that it is too much the eye of
split-second realism and too little the human eye of imagination that
sees visible together with invisible.
Of course, any decent photographer knows weil how to
capture movement on film simply by slowing down the speed of the
shutter or by changing the depth of field. Mor~over, it has
sometimes been photography that has shown the errors of painting.
Eadweard Muybridge's famous photographs of horses in motion
showed that the Wflying gallopW position with all four of the horse's
legs off the ground at once depicted in many paintings simp1y does
not occur. 15 Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty coüld not have created
his own gallery or wmuses imaginairewin Eye snd Mind without the
service of the camera and photographie reproduction. We add to
this the fact that Merleau-Ponty's philosophical writing often
l~ Cf. William J. Mitcbell, 1M Reco'fllgured Eye: Vlsu6l Truth in rite Posl-Photograhlc
Era (Cambridge: Mrr PIe.., 1992), p. 26.
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incorporated the terminology of the latest technologies: television,
computers, even spaee travel. In all these ways, Merleau-Ponty's
eritique of the eamera strikes us ~s odd and out of tempo with the
best of his philosophy of arte
Nevertheless, I think that what Merleau-Ponty is driving at
can be restated with some validity. The photograph is tied to
eausality in a way that painting is not. When William Henry Fox
Talbot perfeeted the art of ehemieally fixing an image through the
camera obseura in 1839, and nearly simultaneously in Franee
daguerreotypes made their appearanee, Talbot announeed to the
Royal Society that he had invented a way to reeord images on paper
·by the ageney of light alone, without any aid whatever from the
artist's pencil.• 18 Many believed that painting was dead. This
causality of light on film remains inescapable in photography, and
this does not denigrate the artistic, intentional acts of the
photographer in seleeting a station point, framing the scene and
choosing the moment to expose the film, as weil as the darkroom
aets of developing, enlarging, cropping and printing. There is an
irremedial element of realism in the photograph that bonds image to
referent ..with superglue... 17 A photograph is fossilized light that
is a direct physieal imprint like a fingerprint. In his landmark essay
on ·The Ontology of the Photograhic Image,• Andre Bazin eompared
photographs to death masks such. as the Holy Shroud of Turin that
transfers the reality of the thing to its reproduetion. 18 The
nonexistence of angels does not prevent one from painting a picture
of angels, but you cannot take a picture of an angel.
This eausal realism in photography means that this art
represents the intrusion of science into art, and this must be a large
measure of what undergirds Merleau-Ponty's distress with
photography. It is extremely difficult to fake a photograph. There
have been famous episodes of efforts to fake photographs by
16 Fox Talbot, •ABrief Hiltorical Sketch of Ihe Invention of the Art,· in Classlc Essays
on Pholography, cd. Alan Trachtenbe... (New Haven: Leete'.laland Boob, 1980), p. 27.
17 Mitchell, The Recortflgure4 Eye, p. 18.
11 Andre Bazin, "11le OntololY of tbe Photo,raphic Image: in WMI ls Onema?
(Hefteley: Univenity of Califomia Prc.., 1967).
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airbrushing and other techniques, as weil as combination
photograph~ and photomontages. Such seamless transformations
and combinations are technically difficult and time-consuming, ,and
as long as the original negative is available for inspection, the
transformations can be found out. The modernist photographer
Edward Weston took this iotegrity and closure of the photograph as
the hallmark of photography in contrast with painting. ·The
photographic image,· he wrote, ·partakes more of the nature of a
mosaic thari of a drawing or painting. It contains no lines in the
painter's sense, but is entirely made up of tiny particles ... by the
intrusion of handwork, by too great enlargment, by printing on a
rough surface, etc., the integrity of the photograph is
destroyed.• 19 Weston regarded the introduction of hand work
and manipulation in photography as the expression of the desire to
paint. This illuminates Merleau-Ponty's position as weil, for it
contrasts the technological art of camera eye and emulsion coated
film with painting's more embodied art of eye and hand.
With all this said, however, photography has very recently
entered a newage, an age that some are going so far as to call a
·post-photographic era,· and an age that seems to me to give
Merleau-Ponty exactly what he found in painting and what he
wanted from photography, the ability to lie, more properly, the
ability to interweave the visible and invisible, the imaginary and
aetual, daytime and oneiric images. Computer digital imaging has
freed the photograph from the realism of causal imprinting. The
elementary operation of digital imaging is assignment of an integer
value to a pixel or cell on a grid in order to specify its tone or color.
This is done with scanning devices that are digital ·cameras· such
as are carried by satellites and many of us have used on a smaller
scale in Mae labs, or it is done with personal computer programs
known as ·paint· programs. Once the visual information is stored,
none of the photo negative's recalcitrance is present. The digital
information can be manipulated rapidly and easily by computer,
simply assigning new digits for old. Digital imaging blurs the
customary distinetions between painting and photography, between
19 Edward Welton, "Seeina PhÖtographicaUy: in Trachtenberg, ed., ~slc Essays on
Pholography, p. 170.
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handmade and mechanical images.20 Through digital imaging we
can approximate the juxtapositions and contradictions in paintings
by Magritte and Escher.
Digital imaging technology has now permeated the
communications industries. In 1989, the Wall Street Journal
estimated that ten percent of all color photographs published in the
United States were being digitally retouched or altered.21 We can
now see images of the dead Elvis voting in the '92 Presidential
election and Teddy Kennedy replacing AI Gore as Governor CUnton's
running mate. After the Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion,
a video clip of an Italian cement factory was passed to American
television networks as footage of the damaged reactor. In 1989,
Time magazine's retrospective on 150 years öf photojournalism
showed not the solitary image of one Astrona~t Aldrin on the moon,
but a veritable lunar invasion by seven astronauts, through the
computer manipulation of Quantel Graphie Paintbox. In a dark and
sinister version of the new power of electronic photo imaging,
America watched the Gulf War through carefully selected,
electronically captured, sometimes digitally processed images of
distant and impersonal destruction. Slaughter became a video
game.22 News pictures must increasingly be viewed more as
illustrations than evidence and photographs are not as real as they
once seemed.
It may seem paradoxi.cal that when Merleau-Ponty held
photography up to the standard of painting and seemed thereby to
evidence a nostalgia for the pre-photographic age, it turns out that
his philosophy of painting looked forward to the post-photographic
age of the blurring of painting and photography. This result leaves
us with all the ambiguities, contingencies, and dilemmas of ethical
decision and action that Merleau-Ponty believed to comprise the
very substance of the human world. He once wrote that his was "a
philosophy that arouses in us a love for our times which are not the
~ Cf. Willial11l, 7Jae RecMfllgured Eye, Chapter 1, pp. 4-8.
21 Clare Anlberry, •Alteratioßl of Photo. bille Holt of LeIai, Elhicalluuel,· 71Je waU
Street Journal, January 26, 1989, BI. Cited in WiUial11l, 1M RecMfllgured Eye, p. 16.
22 Cf. WilliaDll, 7Jae RecOlfllgured Eye, Chapten 2 end 3.
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simple repetition of human eternity nor merely the conclusion to
premises already postulated. It is a view which like the most fragile
object of perception--a soap bubble, or a wave--or like the most
simple dialogue, 'embraces indivisibly all the. order and disorder of
the world" (HT, 188-189; HT, 310). Perhaps we ean find in
Merleau-Ponty's account of the work of the painter and o'f
"polymorphous Being" some of the germs of a "postmodern
metaphysic" that does not suecumb to either the exeesses of
philosophieal totalization or sceptieal negation. Upon his return to
Paris after completing Eye snd Mind, Merleau-Ponty wrote in the
Prefaee to 5i(Jns: "Underneath the clamor a silence is growing, an
expectation. Why could it not be a hope?" (5, 23; 5, 32). Merleau-
Ponty would no doubt be disturbed by the threats to privaey offered
by digital image surveillance, and the burgeoning alliance between
eapitalist image-making and the confusions it engenders between
the ideology of entertainment and the real injuries of poverty, war,
elass, raee and sex. Vet as far as photography and art are
concerned, ane must imagine Merleau-Ponty happy in
Tomorrowland.23 ..
University of Rhode Island GALEN A. JOHN50N
23 The am,ibuity of thil outcome il retlected in tbe lall line of tbe euey. Cf. the lall tine
of Albert CamuI, "1be Myth of Silyphul," in 1M Mylh 0/Slsyplry, anti Other Es,ay" trau.
Jultin Q'Brien (New Yolt: Random Boule, 1955): "ODe mull ima,ine (il faut ima,iner)
Silyphul happy. "
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